Confidentiality by Benatar, D
Unlike some other principles in contempo-
rary bioethics, such as principles of
(patient) autonomy and (doctors’) truth-
telling, the principle of confidentiality has
been recognised since ancient times to be
essential to the professional ethics of med-
ical practitioners. As important as this
principle is, however, it has limits.There
are some occasions when it is outweighed
by competing moral considerations.
Determining when this is so is often diffi-
cult.There is no simple formula that can
be applied to establish when confidential-
ity ought to be breached. However, if we
understand the values on which the princi-
ple of confidentiality is based, we are bet-
ter equipped to assess whether the princi-
ple ought to be sacrificed in a given cir-
cumstance.
UNDERLYING VALUES
Confidentiality’s value is not intrinsic but
rather instrumental.That is to say, the
value of confidentiality is derivative from
the other values it advances.We can distin-
guish four such values: autonomy, privacy,
promise-keeping and utility (or welfare).
Autonomy
Autonomous beings are those that are
capable of controlling their own lives.They
are beings that can deliberate and, in the
absence of any external restrictions, act on
their deliberations. Healthy adult humans
typically are, in this sense, autonomous (to
varying degrees). Given that they are
autonomous in this way, they have an
interest in having this autonomy respected.
Confidentiality protects the autonomy of
patients by allowing them to control infor-
mation about themselves.This is particu-
larly important given the often sensitive
and personal nature of the information
that medical practitioners can acquire, and
the damaging ways in which such informa-
tion could be used.
Privacy
Although privacy, like confidentiality, can
foster a person’s autonomy, people also
tend to value privacy independently of
concerns about autonomy. Feelings of
shame and vulnerability lead people to
value their privacy. Confidentiality obvi-
ously fosters privacy by preventing the
spread of privileged information that
would violate privacy.
Promise-keeping
Given that doctors undertake to preserve
confidentiality, the importance of confi-
dentiality is also based on the value of
promise-keeping. Sometimes the promise
to keep information in confidence is
explicit, but it is often implicit. Patients
know that doctors have duties of confiden-
tiality and have often taken oaths to affirm
those duties. Patients consult doctors in
this knowledge and often without securing
explicit promises from the doctors directly
to them.The professional norms of pre-
serving confidentiality are so widespread
that patients can reasonably assume their















and applied. In addi-




Town, where he is
based, he also teach-




Confidentiality is an important principle in med-
ical ethics, but one that may be overriden in
some circumstances.
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Utility
Confidentiality in medicine greatly
enhances utility by leading to
improved health care, both of the
individual patient and of society. If
patients had no assurance that doc-
tors would respect confidentiality,
they would be more reluctant to
consult doctors.The upshot of this
would be that many more people
would suffer and even die than is
the case where people feel more
comfortable consulting doctors. An
individual’s health is therefore
improved. Public health is also
improved, both by iterating the
individual benefits and by avoiding
the exponential ill-effects of un-
diagnosed contagious diseases.
MORAL LIMITS
One obvious condition that would
justify divulging confidential infor-
mation is the consent of the person
to whom the duty of confidentiality
is owed.Where such consent is
given, private information is con-
veyed but the duty of confidential-
ity is not breached.This is because
the patient, in giving the consent,
waives the right to confidentiality.
Typically, the consent to convey
private medical information is lim-
ited: the patient grants a medical
practitioner permission to provide
specific information to a specific
person or group of people.
The dilemmas of preserving confi-
dentiality arise in those situations
in which there is no consent to dis-
close.These dilemmas, at least in
their most difficult forms, arise
where the principle of confidentiali-
ty conflicts with a principle of harm
prevention. It is helpful to consider
separately two categories of harm
prevention:
• the prevention of harm to people
other than the person to whom
the duty of confidentiality is
owed
• the prevention of harm to the
very person to whom the duty of
confidentiality is owed.
We might call the former ‘harm to
others’ and the latter ‘harm to the
patient’.
Harm to others
The others may be one or many.
For example, preserving confiden-
tiality about a patient’s HIV-posi-
tive status may pose a threat to one
other person (the spouse) if the
patient is in a faithful monoga-
mous relationship, or many other
people (various potential sexual
partners) if the patient is promis-
cuous.
In such situations, the patient’s
interest in autonomy, privacy and
promise-keeping obviously persists.
However, the moral weight of these
interests is limited. The value of
one person’s autonomy, for exam-
ple, is bounded by the value of
others’ autonomy. My right to lead
my life as I please cannot extend to
limiting your autonomy (beyond
the limitation on your freedom to
interfere with me). Privacy and
promise-keeping too have their
limits. Thus, if any one of these
three values — autonomy, privacy
or promise-keeping — were pitted
against serious harm to others, the
prevention of harm would certainly
prevail. Although they have greater
strength together, they would still
be outweighed by sufficiently seri-
ous harms to others.
One way in which confidentiality
dilemmas can become difficult is if
it is unclear whether the harm is
sufficiently weighty. Although a sig-
nificant threat to life may defeat
the other values, it is less clear
whether more remote threats of
this kind, or significant threats of
lesser harms, are strong enough.
A second and more common way
in which confidentiality dilemmas
become vexing is seen if we exam-
ine the fourth underlying value —
utility. Where confidentiality does
not conflict with the prevention of
harm, all considerations of utility
usually support the preserving of
confidentiality. In cases of conflict,
the usual utility of keeping confi-
dence (outlined above) must be
balanced against the disutility of
doing so — the harm to others. In
other words, we are caught on the
horns of a utility dilemma — sacri-
fice the long-term utility of keeping
confidentiality for the short-term
gain of preventing harm, or pre-
serve the long-term gain at the cost
of not preventing the more imme-
diate harm. The fact is that most of
the long-term benefits can be pre-
served if breaches are sufficiently
few. However, the erosion of these
benefits is incremental with each
breach, and their loss can thus
creep up imperceptibly.
Harm to the patient
Sometimes the person whom one
seeks to protect from harm is the
very patient to whom the duty of
confidentiality is owed. Consider,
for example, a patient who does
not want his diagnosis made
known to a spouse or parent even
though the spouse’s or parent’s
knowledge of the diagnosis could
greatly benefit the patient. Or con-
sider a patient whom a doctor
finds to have been abused, but who
does not want the doctor to make
this known to other people, even
though such a disclosure could
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which there is no
consent to disclose.
prevent more such abuse. Where
the patient’s autonomy is intact,
overriding that autonomy in the
name of benefiting the patient is an
unwarranted form of paternalism
and is unjustified (although
attempting to persuade the patient
about the importance of disclosure
would be appropriate).
Autonomous agents have the
capacity to decide for themselves
whether their welfare is best served
by breaches of confidentiality. Thus
violating confidentiality to prevent
harm to the patient to whom confi-
dentiality is owed can be accept-
able only where the patient’s
capacity for autonomy is sufficient-
ly compromised or absent. In that
case, the autonomy is no longer a
value or, in the case of limited
autonomy, a sufficiently strong
value underlying the preservation
of confidentiality. The other three
underlying values do remain intact.
As the patient cannot assess their
relative value, a guardian or proxy-
decision maker must make that
determination on the patient’s
behalf. Privacy and promise-keep-
ing considerations will typically
weigh less heavily for the incompe-
tent, and especially for those who
were never competent. Although
they may have greater weight for
members of the patient’s family,
they will be outweighed in the
same conditions under which a
patient’s interest in privacy or
promise-keeping is defeated by the
prevention of harm to others.
HOW TO BREACH
Because breaching confidentiality
(without consent) always has some
cost, it should be avoided if possi-
ble. Thus the preferred first course
of action should be to persuade the
patient (or patient’s guardian) of
the moral importance of disclosing
the relevant information. Some
medical practitioners are reluctant
to bring moral pressure to bear on
patients to consent to disclosure.
Such concern is sometimes well-
founded where disclosure is the
greater of the evils. However,
where it has been determined that
breaching confidentiality may be
required, it is obviously preferable
to obtain patient consent for the
disclosure. At least in such circum-
stances moral pressure in eliciting
consent is entirely apt.
Sometimes, but relatively rarely,
consent is not forthcoming, and a
breach of confidentiality is neces-
sary. In such conditions, one prin-
ciple should govern the breach.
This is the principle of minimising
the costs of the breach. That is to
say, one ought to break confidence
in the least damaging way consis-
tent with the required goal of pre-
venting harm. On this principle,
one would be required to disclose
the least information and to the
fewest people necessary to attain
the goal. One ought usually also to
provide advance warning to the
patient (or patient’s guardian
where the patient is non-
autonomous) of one’s plan to
break confidentiality. Very often
one will find that at this point, a
patient will decide that given the
doctor’s intent, the patient would
rather disclose the information
himself, perhaps with the assis-
tance of the doctor. Where the
patient does not relent, he or she
will at least have the opportunity to




Although the real dilemmas of
whether to breach confidentiality
often interest doctors, there are
highly suspect assaults on confi-
dentiality that receive very little
attention. The most obvious of
these is indiscretion. Some doctors
are scrupulous in exercising discre-
tion, but others are not. Many talk
about patients in corridors, eleva-
tors and other public spaces. They
leave confidential documents lying
around. They sometimes fail to
delete personally identifying details
when presenting cases at academic
meetings. They talk with their
spouses or gratuitously with col-
leagues not involved in a particular
patient’s care. Just mentioning that
somebody is one’s patient can con-
stitute a breach of confidentiality.
Imagine a psychiatrist, for exam-
ple, making it known that a partic-
ular person is his patient. Another
form of indiscretion is poor control
over patient files. Consider, for
example, a private doctor who,
upon retirement or sale of a prac-
tice, transfers all his patients’ files
to another doctor without the
patients’ consent. Patients, particu-
larly in the private sector, should
be entitled to choose which doc-
tors have access to their medical
records.
MAIN TOPIC




from harm is the
very patient to
whom the duty of
confidentiality is
owed. 






Less well-recognised by many doc-
tors is the threat that large hospi-
tals and medical teams pose to
confidentiality. Where a patient is
cared for by a single doctor, per-
haps with an occasional referral to
a specialist, few people have access
to information about the patient.
In large hospitals and medical
teams, dozens of people may be
involved in a patient’s care and
hundreds of people might have
access to a medical file. The prob-
lem is sometimes exacerbated
when medical files are stored elec-
tronically. Not only is private infor-
mation more widely known when
so many people have access to it,
but the risk of further information
leakage is also greater. Institutional
safeguards, such as limiting access
to medical files, and clinical and
clerical staff awareness about the
importance of confidentiality are
necessary to limit the damage that
large medical teams do to confi-
dentiality.
Private health insurance is another
threat to confidentiality. This is
because of the danger that asym-
metrical knowledge would pose to
a private health insurance scheme.
If patients had medical information
about themselves that was not dis-
closed to private insurers, high-risk
people would self-select into insur-
ance schemes and low-risk people
would opt out. The upshot of this
would be the eventual collapse of
the insurance scheme. If insurers
and insured both have access to
the information then this problem
is avoided, but it is avoided at the
cost of confidentiality. Very few
people would willingly disclose pri-
vate medical information to insur-
ance companies if they did not fear
the alternative of being medically
uninsured. The disclosures, in
effect, are coerced by circum-
stance. Notice that this dilemma
between insurance failure and loss
of confidentiality could be avoided
by the community-rating of risks
characteristic of public health
insurance. As everyone is automati-
cally insured by such a system,
there is no need for the insurers to
have private information about the
insured in order to insure them.
Asymmetrical knowledge therefore
does not threaten public insurance.
CONCLUSION
Confidentiality is an important
principle in medical practice.
However, it is not an absolute prin-
ciple. There are circumstances
where it may be breached, typically
to prevent serious harm. Where the
principle is indeed outweighed by
countervailing considerations, its
sacrifice is regrettable but justified.
Where confidentiality is sacrificed
in the absence of competing values
— as it is in cases of indiscretion,
for example — the breach of confi-
dence is not only regrettable but
also unjustified.
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• Confidentiality is an important
but non-absolute principle of
medical ethics.
• The moral value of confidential-
ity is derivative from four under-
lying values: autonomy, privacy,
promise-keeping and utility (or
welfare). 
• Where patients consent to infor-
mation being divulged, there is
no breach of confidentiality.
• The dilemmas of whether to
breach confidentiality arise
when this principle conflicts
with the principle of harm-pre-
vention. 
• The harm one seeks to prevent
may be either to people other
than the patient or to the
patient to whom the duty of
confidentiality is owed. In the
latter case it can be justified
only where the patient is not
autonomous. 
• Where confidentiality must be
breached, it should be done by
minimising the moral costs of
the breach.
• Threats to confidentiality
include: indiscretion, large hos-
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